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LOST IN TRANSLATION: THE ACCIDENTAL
ORIGINS OF BOND V. UNITED STATES
Kevin L. Cope *

INTRODUCTION
One of the unusual features of cases about the constitutionality of
federal statutes is that they are nearly always foreseeable. Even before the
bill’s introduction in Congress, lawmakers are often aware that they are
inviting a federal lawsuit. Anticipating a legal challenge, legislators and their
staffs attempt to predict the courts’ views of the statute and adapt the bill
accordingly. 1 Generally speaking, the bigger the bill’s potential constitutional
impact, the more foreseeable the resulting case. By this logic, jurists should
have seen the constitutional issues in Bond v. United States 2 from a mile
away. In reality, they were foreseen by virtually no one.
Bond addresses the constitutionality of a high-profile act of Congress,
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
(hereinafter the “Act” or the “Implementation Act”). 3 The Act domesticizes
the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”), a global treaty concluded in
1993, which the United States joined four years later. 4 The CWC is expressly
aimed at stopping the development, stockpiling, and deployment of chemical
weapons of mass destruction. The Act’s application in Bond tests the limits
of Congress’s power to implement treaties that encroach on traditional state
prerogatives. The specific question before the Court is whether the Necessary

*
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank
Adam Chilton, Tom Ginsburg, Andrew Hayashi, Duncan Hollis, David Koplow, Eric Posner,
Pierre-Hughes Verdier, Mila Versteeg, and David Sloss for helpful comments on earlier
versions of the Essay.
1. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001), invalidated in part by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd2000dd-1 (2006), invalidated in part by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
2. Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (S. Ct. argued Nov. 5, 2013).
3. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229
(1998).
4. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 112 Stat. 2681–856, 1974
U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter CWC].
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and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Missouri v. Holland allow
Congress to penalize “local” conduct not within any of its enumerated
powers—and in fact quintessentially within the states’ police powers—when
it is implementing a valid treaty. 5
Both parties and numerous amici now seem to believe that the case
could transform key parts of federalism doctrine and/or the United States’
ability to make treaty commitments. 6 Yet despite the plethora of legal
expertise in Congress and the executive branch, no one seemed aware of
these issues until Bond’s attorneys raised them before a federal district court
in 2007. Given Bond’s grand, disarmament-treaty origins, that oversight will
probably trouble anyone interested in the growing role of international law 7
in the U.S. federal legal system.
Much has been written about how Bond should be decided and how its
outcome could shape constitutional law and U.S. foreign relations. This
Essay instead looks backward, exploring the strange roots of Bond and what
those origins say about the process by which the United States converts
treaties into federal law. The Essay suggests that the reason that Bond—and
its implications for treaties and federalism— took so many by surprise lies in
the incentives inherent in the arcane art of translating international law into
domestic law. In that sense, Bond is a cautionary tale for future treatyimplementation efforts.
I.

The Background of Bond: The Chemical Weapons Convention

The prosecution that triggered the case began in 2007, nine years after
Congress implemented the CWC by passing the Implementation Act. A 42year-old suburban Philadelphia woman named Carol Anne Bond rubbed
two abrasive chemicals (one of which she took from her workplace, the other
5. Before the district court, the government disavowed reliance on the Commerce
Clause. In the Third Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court, however, the government
raised a Commerce Clause argument, although the court declined to consider it. See United
States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 162 n.14 (3d Cir. 2012) (declining to address government’s
“newly-discovered” argument in light of the court’s holding under the treaty power and
Necessary and Proper Clause).
6. See, e.g., Brief for Profs. David M. Golove, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 4, Bond, (No. 12-158) (“[T]he Nation’s ability to make treaties would be severely
compromised if the President were unable to assure treaty partners that the national
government has the power to enforce its promises.”).
7. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 397 (1998) (“Because treaties now regulate matters that countries traditionally have
considered internal, there is an increasing likelihood of overlap, and conflict, with domestic
law.”).
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she ordered on Amazon.com) on the mailbox and car door of her friend
Myrlinda Haynes. Bond had recently learned that Haynes was pregnant and
that Bond’s husband was the father. On one occasion, some chemicals
rubbed off on Haynes’s hand and she suffered a minor thumb burn. When
Haynes told the police, local officials declined to pursue the matter, believing
the substance to be some form of cocaine.
The whole incident might have ended there, but because a mailbox was
involved, eventually so, too, was the U.S. Postal Service. To the surprise of
almost everyone, federal prosecutors in Philadelphia stepped in and charged
Bond under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. The
charged offense carried a maximum sentence of life in federal prison.
Anyone who might have “harbored” Bond with knowledge of her actions
faced a potential ten-year term.
Those bizarre events directly triggered the Bond prosecution, but the
case’s real origins trace back fourteen years earlier to 1993, when the CWC
was adopted. According to the CWC’s preamble, its purpose is to achieve
“the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction”
and, “for the sake of all mankind,” to effect “the complete and effective
prohibition of the development, . . . stockpiling, . . . transfer and use of
chemical weapons.”
In implementing the CWC, Congress and the State Department
appeared to be singularly focused on global security. In explaining the
CWC’s purpose to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the director
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency began by noting that
“[s]topping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is at the very
top of President Clinton’s foreign policy agenda.” The director characterized
the CWC as “both a disarmament and a nonproliferation Treaty,” which
“establishes an unprecedented global norm against chemical weapons” that
would eventually help to “eliminate this serious threat to our country and to
world peace.” 8 Secretary of State Christopher testified that the Convention
“promises to eliminate a scourge [i.e., chemical weapons] that has hung over
the world for almost 80 years.” 9
Those statements may characterize the CWC’s purpose, but, as Bond has
proved, they may not reflect its actual effect on U.S. law. Despite this focus
on global security and weapons of mass destruction, the text of both the
CWC and the Act arguably sweep far more broadly—and locally. The CWC
requires each state party to stop the prohibited use of chemical weapons
within its jurisdiction. Those prohibitions mean that a state and its subjects

8. Chemical Weapons Convention: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
103d Cong. 11 (1994) (statement of Hon. John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency).
9. Id. (statement of Warren Christopher, Secretary of State).
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may not “use,” “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain
chemical weapons.” “Chemical weapons” are defined in part as “[t]oxic
chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention.” And “toxic chemical” means “[a]ny
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”
Purposes “not prohibited” include “[i]ndustrial, agricultural, research,
medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.” It seems clear that the
treaty drafters envisioned that state parties would prohibit the use of all toxic
chemicals and their precursors (unless they are used for purposes “not
prohibited”). 10 Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the drafters were
concerned with Bond-like uses, that is, minor, non-politically-motivated
assaults with otherwise legal chemicals that are harmful only when used off
label. Thus, although there is little reason to believe that the CWC drafters
intended it, the CWC’s language arguably requires state parties to
criminalize all non-”peaceful” chemical uses not just of traditional chemical
weapons and potential weapons, but of many household chemicals as well.
II. The Chemical Weapons Convention’s U.S. Implementation
The United States may have unknowingly succeeded in creating just
such a criminal regime. The Act copies most of the CWC’s key provisions
verbatim. In essence, any chemical that can potentially cause any
“permanent harm” and is used for anything other than a “peaceful purpose”
is a “chemical weapon.” It is a violation of the Act knowingly to, among
other things, possess that “weapon,” threaten to use it, or actually use it. This
formulation led Justice Alito to suggest that “pouring a bottle of vinegar in
[a] friend’s goldfish bowl” might be punishable under the Act. 11 The Third
Circuit noted that the Act’s breadth was “striking,” “turn[ing] each kitchen
cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America into a potential chemical
weapons cache.” 12

10. See Brief of Amici Curiae Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiators and Experts
in Support of Respondent at 8, Bond, (No. 12-158) (stating that the negotiators considered a
broad prohibition “necessary to avoid proliferation of chemical weapons to those who might
use them improperly and to prevent the development, manufacture or stockpiling of chemical
weapons under the guise of commercial activity”).
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Bond, (No. 09-1227) (S. Ct. Feb. 22, 2011) (Alito,
J.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/091227.pdf.
12. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 154 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012).
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The government has not distanced itself from that interpretation; in fact,
it now appears to have embraced it. Before lower federal courts and the
Supreme Court, Justice Department attorneys argued not only that the U.S.
Constitution gives it the authority to prosecute Bond but that international
law and foreign-relations considerations also effectively demand that power.
The government insisted that if the United States could not prosecute the
likes of Bond under the Act because “local” cases were outside the Act’s
domain, it “would hamstring U.S. treaty negotiators” and “undermine global
confidence in the United States as a reliable treaty partner, to the detriment
of the foreign policy and national security of the United States.”
During the CWC’s ratification and its implementation, these grave
concerns about the law’s effective scope apparently concerned no one—not
in the Justice Department, the State Department, or in Congress. People
regularly use chemicals to injure. But neither the congressional debates nor
the testimony by State Department officials and other experts suggested that
the Act could be used for purposes other than preventing chemical warfare
and terrorism, much less prosecutions of routine assaults. 13 In fact, Congress
ostensibly envisioned that only the most egregious criminal acts would
violate the CWC’s implementing legislation. As the Senate committee that
recommended consenting to ratification noted, the then-proposed penalties
for “knowingly engag[ing] in prohibited [chemical weapons]–related
activities”—even those falling short of “actual use”—included life in prison. 14
Moreover, the legal concepts that would become central to Bond—the
scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the correct reading of
Missouri v. Holland—were never raised publicly, either by legal expert
committee witnesses, by members of Congress, or by executive officials. 15
The single congressional hearing dedicated to the Act’s constitutionality
focused on unrelated issues: the propriety of allowing an international treaty
compliance officer to exercise the authority of a U.S. officer and how
mandatory inspections of private property would implicate the Fourth

13. See, e.g., Chemical Weapons Implementing Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997); Constitutional Implications of the Chemical Weapons
Convention: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 104th Cong. (1996).
14. S. EXEC. REP NO. 104-33, at 210 (1996) (report of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations).
15. Of course, it is possible that participants in the implementation process noted
privately that the Act’s comprehensive language could theoretically lead to routine, Bond-like
prosecutions, i.e., those involving no federal or international interests. They may have
assumed, however, that judicious prosecutorial discretion would confine prosecutions under
the Act to those implicating the instruments’ stated focuses: weapons of mass destruction,
arms control, terrorism, and other issues relevant to national or global security. In that case,
they may have focused their political capital on higher priority constitutional, foreign-policy,
and security issues.
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Amendment. 16 If anyone had closely read the Act’s language and anticipated
that it would cause Bond-like prosecutions, surely some states’ rights–
minded member of Congress would have sounded the alarm and asked an
executive official whether the CWC or the Act might be used to displace
state-law criminal regimes. No one so much as hinted at that possibility.
III. An International-to-Domestic-Law Mistranslation
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bond could significantly curtail the
scope of Congress’s foreign-relations power or expand its power to regulate
local conduct. As to the foreign-relations effect, the government and others
have argued that were the country’s ability to implement some treaties
limited by domestic constitutional constraints, these constraints could
undermine the credibility of its international agreements and frustrate the
president’s ability to make such commitments in the first place.
As to the scope of congressional power, a decision for the government
on broad grounds could open the door to additional federal regulation in
areas (some of which the states may be regulating adequately) that lie outside
Congress’s enumerated powers. With Bond, the United States already
complied with large portions of the treaty through its state criminal regimes:
no one has suggested that Pennsylvania or any other state has a generally
dysfunctional criminal system as to chemical batteries (even if local officials
misjudged this case). The Act—unlike the statute in Holland—seeks to
regulate an area of traditional state expertise that the states are eager to
handle themselves. 17 If Congress can legislate in these areas, it arguably
pushes the line established in Holland back a bit further.
One explanation for why no one involved in the CWC or the Act
anticipated these issues lies in the incentives facing nation-states
implementing treaties. Not surprisingly, the treaty’s foreign drafters were not
experts on U.S. federalism. By contrast, State Department lawyers and many
congressional staff are. But, perhaps erring on the side of caution, Congress

16. Chemical Weapons Convention: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
103d Cong. (1994) (statement of John Yoo).
17. A critical but often overlooked element of the Holland decision is that the federal
Migratory Bird Treaty Act was probably the only way for the United States to comply with the
treaty. Missouri resisted the entire purpose of the treaty, and it zealously defended the
unfettered right of its citizens to hunt the birds. That opposition was probably a key reason
that the statute was deemed constitutional; in the face of Missouri’s defiance, the statute was
“necessary” to accomplish the federal objective. Given Pennsylvania’s functional criminal-legal
regime and the state’s general willingness to prosecute assaults (albeit not in this case), the
same cannot be said about the Act’s application in Bond.
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chose to copy the CWC’s key language largely verbatim, with no public
mention of those words’ consequences for federalism.
This phenomenon might be described as a “teach-to-the-test” effect.
U.S. public school teachers are incentivized to “translate” as closely as
possible the state-approved curriculum into their class lesson plans. A
teacher who does so is likely to see her students’ scores rise, which will
improve her personal evaluations. If the standard curriculum turns out to be
pedagogically deficient, her costs are few: the bureaucracy, not the teacher, is
blamed. She is unlikely to realize many substantive benefits from a more
creative approach. Conversely, if she strays from the standard material and
her students perform poorly, she’s likely to be held responsible.
A similar effect may be at work when Congress implements
international agreements like the CWC. Congressional drafters have little to
gain by developing creative approaches to fulfill those agreements. If they
play it safe and simply import the CWC’s language, they can rest assured
knowing they have covered all their international-law bases. Any negative
domestic consequences can be blamed on the treaty itself, on other members
of Congress for not inserting reservations (although the CWC itself prohibits
them), or on the president for signing the treaty in the first place. These
incentives should tend to produce literal translations from the international
law to the domestic law.
In most other cases, Congress is attentive to the federalism implications
of multilateral treaties: consider the roadblocks faced by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
These treaties all require state parties to prohibit behaviors that are often
within the traditional purview of U.S. states, e.g., child neglect, criminal
punishment, and state-government procurement. Each treaty lingered for
years or was stymied altogether, largely because of federalism concerns. 18
The CWC is unusual in this respect. To the extent that it threatens
current federalism norms, it has proved a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Like these
treaties, the CWC requires its members to prohibit certain conduct by its
citizens. But that conduct is qualitatively different because the CWC
purports to address a prototypical national and international concern: the
development and stockpiling of weapons of war. The CWC is ostensibly
aimed at states and terrorists, with the outward goal of promoting
international peace and security. That outward objective may have distracted
lawmakers implementing the CWC from its elements that, like similar
elements in controversial human rights treaties, can reach into domestic and

18. See Robert Anderson IV, “Ascertained in a Different Way”: The Treaty Power at the
Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 237 (2001).
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local affairs and that have nothing to do with international peace and
security.
CONCLUSION
Whatever Bond’s outcome, the Act’s congressional drafters may have
accidentally laid the groundwork for a watershed in federal–state relations
and, perhaps, in U.S. foreign relations. If this case, with these several
important implications, has taken its creators by surprise, why does its
strange origin matter to anyone besides Carol Bond? It matters because the
case underscores the dangers of poorly translating international law into
domestic law, particularly given the complexities of federalism. Congress’s
attempt to minimize “translation errors” by copying pertinent phrases
verbatim may dot all the “i’s” and cross all the “t’s,” but it can compromise
the spirit, or true purpose, of the international law. This verbatim translation
can distort the effect of the statute when courts—which usually look first to
statutes’ plain language—interpret the law. As with crude languagetranslation software, the overarching purpose of the language is lost to
literalism.
In the realm of treaty interpretation, this process can produce
unforeseen, unintended consequences. Here, the overly literal translation of
international law has created a law that turns many kitchen cupboards into
“potential chemical weapons cache[s].” The result is predictable: a criminal
regime that punishes routine, misdemeanor batterers as if they were
terrorists and illegal-arms dealers, a consequence unlikely to find much
support regardless of political or legal ideology. Given the expanding scope
of issues subject to multilateral treaties in recent years, 19 these unintended
domestic effects might well become increasingly commonplace, especially
where they come packaged as international security or trade conventions.
That result is hardly inevitable. For instance, the CWC, like many other
treaties, acknowledges that each state party shall implement its obligations
under the Convention “in accordance with its constitutional
processes.” 20Had Congress foreseen that federal prosecutors would use the
Act to pursue people like Carol Bond, it might have found other ways, “in
accordance with [U.S.] constitutional processes,” to fulfill its obligation to

19. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 397; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1869–70 (2005) (arguing that affording Congress a broad
treaty-implementation power is troubling, especially given the “explosion of the United States’s
commitments under international law”).
20. CWC art. VII, Jan. 13, 1993, 112 Stat. 2681–856, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
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prohibit nonpeaceful chemical uses. For instance, Congress could have
simply created a multitiered sentencing scheme, in which minor assaults
were recognized and punished as such. Alternatively, Congress could have
relied on existing U.S. state criminal regimes to cover nonpeaceful uses of
chemicals (as in Bond) that have nothing to do with international peace,
terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction. For example, prior to the Act, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 prohibited the use of
chemical weapons. But it defined “chemical weapon” more narrowly, as “a
weapon that is designed or intended to cause widespread death or serious
bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or
poisonous chemicals or precursors of toxic or poisonous chemicals.” That
definition, in conjunction with the existing state schemes, would also have
fulfilled the pertinent U.S. obligations under the CWC.
If it acknowledges the lessons of the CWC and Bond, a future Congress
might look for alternative, more creative ways to implement U.S. treaties.
From an international-law standpoint, those alternatives would certainly be
bolder, perhaps even riskier. But by depriving the Supreme Court of the
chance to reshape foreign-relations federalism in ways that could hamstring
the other branches, the alternatives are more likely to serve the political and
foreign-affairs interests of Congress and the president.
That the issues raised in Bond surprised Congress and so many others
demonstrates the challenges of converting international law into domestic
law in a federal system. Above all, Bond’s history shows how the
implementation process can force lawmakers into the tricky task of
navigating between two ills: straying too far from a convention’s sweeping
directives, which risks breaching international law, and producing uncritical
literal translations of those directives, which risks importing a domestic
regime poorly suited for a domestic system.

